2 replies to this topic

[mab01uk]

If you haven't already seen the latest Miniworld mag there is an interesting article featured in the Jan 2010 issue (Part 2 is next month) by Leslie Palmer who in 1969 became BL's first non-clerical, salaried female employee aged 22 taken on as a graduate management trainee to investigate new methods of working.
She gives several examples of finding management not really knowing if cars such as Coopers or Healeys were actually making a loss and relates how she discovered the Mini 850 was being sold cheaper than the 1000cc even though for 2 or 3 years it had cost more to manufacture its engine because the volume point meant having them specifically engineered. Customers who bought the cars expected smaller to be cheaper but it wasn't the case............

She later needed the basic totals of cars produced and sold each week to make sales projections, etc. Before computerisation this was worked out by hand on a paper spreadsheet. What was built on plant versus what was out at the dealerships and what was sold proved impossible to find out as there was a discrepancy of at least 20% a month. No one knew exactly where all the cars were or how many there were. She found the guy responsible for the figures only to find this had been the case for 12 years! It seems every Friday night a man went out with a torch and wandered round the Longbridge plant counting cars. It turned out the cars were being moved around to make space for more, the paperwork stuck to windscreens often got blown away and once lost mean't the now unidentified cars stood for months on end effectively lost in the system (or lack of one). She says that before 1969 the volumes of Minis, etc, produced were still small enough to keep control of with the old system but from 1969 until about 1978 the explosion in volume plus labour disputes, supplier disputes and lack of enough car parking, along with the workers holidays coinciding with the August registration suffix sales boom compounded the problems.

She goes on to say the Mini Coopers never made money due to the low volumes with high cost of many non-standard parts fitted and that the price premium made it less desirable as a new car but very popular as a secondhand model. The 1275GT replacement was however highly profitable due to mainly using standard parts but John Cooper would not compromise on this, she insists it was this rather than his £2 per car payment that caused the Coopers to be discontinued by BL. "There were huge arguments as the Cooper was a very popular model internally with staff, but the Cooper wasn't selling enough. The 1275GT made money the Cooper didn't."

Edited by mab01uk, 24 November 2009 - 07:35 PM.

[zrblue]

If you haven't already seen the latest Miniworld mag there is an interesting article featured in the Jan 2010 issue (Part 2 is next month) by Leslie Palmer who in 1969 became BL's first non-clerical, salaried female employee aged 22 taken on as a graduate management trainee to investigate new methods of working.
She gives several examples of finding management not really knowing if cars such as Coopers or Healeys were actually making a loss and relates how she discovered the Mini 850 was being sold cheaper than the 1000cc even though for 2 or 3 years it had cost more to manufacture its engine because the volume point meant having them specifically engineered. Customers who bought the cars expected smaller to be cheaper but it wasn't the case............

She later needed the basic totals of cars produced and sold each week to make sales projections, etc. Before computerisation this was worked out by hand on a paper spreadsheet. What was built on plant versus what was out at the dealerships and what was sold proved impossible to find out as there was a discrepancy of at least 20% a month. No one knew exactly where all the cars were or how many there were. She found the guy responsible for the figures only to find this had been the case for 12 years! It seems every Friday night a man went out with a torch and wandered round the Longbridge plant counting cars. It turned out the cars were being moved around to make space for more, the paperwork stuck to windscreens often got blown away and once lost mean't the now unidentified cars stood for months on end effectively lost in the system (or lack of one). She says that before 1969 the volumes of Minis, etc, produced were still small enough to keep control of with the old system but from 1969 until about 1978 the explosion in volume plus labour disputes, supplier disputes and lack of enough car parking, along with the workers holidays coinciding with the August registration suffix sales boom compounded the problems.

She goes on to say the Mini Coopers never made money due to the low volumes with high cost of many non-standard parts fitted and that the price premium made it less desirable as a new car but very popular as a secondhand model. The 1275GT replacement was however highly profitable due to mainly using standard parts but John Cooper would not compromise on this, she insists it was this rather than his £2 per car payment that caused the Coopers to be discontinued by BL. "There were huge arguments as the Cooper was a very popular model internally with staff, but the Cooper wasn't selling enough. The 1275GT made money the Cooper didn't."

Very interesting read...would be great to get the whole story. im doing a masters at uni on business management and find this stuff a bit dull sometimes when its purely theory, but when theres a story attached like this, it makes it much more interesting.

[mab01uk]

Part 2 (6 pages) of the Leslie Palmer article about working for British Leyland 1969 to 1980 is published in this months (Feb 2010) Miniworld and makes an interesting read........
http://www.aronline....oncepts-bmc-9x/
It starts with the work on the 9X the proposed Mini replacement. (See Link above) Asked about any dealings with 9X or Issigonis himself Leslie says, "We saw it from time to time. It never had much support internally. There wasn't money for it, budgets were tight and there wasn't room for it. His was an approach of what he thought the motor industry ought to be, as opposed to what it was. I don't think anybody thought it had legs. There was a bit of support from the emotional sense, but not in a commercial sense. I'd say he was being indulged rather than it was ever a valid project. That sounds dreadful but it's probably true. They put him out to grass, although he was still respected. I didn't meet him directly, I saw him give a lecture or two. The problem he had, or the problem we had with him, was his unwillingness to ever engage with commercialisation. He would only ever do what he wanted to do and he was quite difficult in that sense."

She goes on to describe the discord and discontent with the 'Red Robbo' wildcat strikes, lack of secret workers ballots and abuse of power by both unions and management in the 1970's.

Also the issue of organised stealing from plants is covered. "There was actually a price list of parts for every car that was produced in Longbridge that anybody could buy at a discount. It was eventually traced to a man with a garage better stocked out than our stores. The filching was co-ordinated, it had to be, it had to be done in collaboration with so many people in production control or the stores."

The article concludes with descriptions of the sexism rife amongst workers and management at the time, the class driven divisive structures - there were four different levels of dining room/canteens (Directors included free bar) - and details some of the problems with the old, inherited tired and inefficient dealer network, also gives some interesting background on the launch of the very popular and successful 1979 Mini 20th Anniversary Special, why the Mini kept getting reprieved and finally the 1980 launch of the Metro after which she left Leyland to work elsewhere in market research for the Motor Industry.

Edited by mab01uk, 23 December 2016 - 06:35 PM.